PLANNING FOR UNCERTAINTY
The objective of the study is to test whether scenario planning could result in more [COLLAB]orative and [ADAPT]ative [SPATIAL] decisions in the Fildes Peninsula, King George Island, Antarctica. Scenario planning is a planning tool that allows a disciplined and strategized approach to working with conditions of deep uncertainty without relying on single forecasts of the problem (Hopkins and Zapata 2007). In this study, instead of [COLLAB]oration and [ADAPT]ation being viewed as ideals, they are tested as outcomes of [SPATIAL] decisions. The hypothesis of this study is to validate the claim that, when scenario planning is used as a tool in a place that is ground zero for overlapping national interests, more effective [SPATIAL] decisions could be made under the rising uncertainty, once that are more capable of supporting inter-program [COLLAB]oration than the usual approaches (Christensen 1985).
The research framework combines two structured components:
Firstly, it follows the four-scenario typology proposed in the journal article “Is it all going south? Four future scenarios for Antarctica” written by Liggett et al. (2017), where possible Antarctic futures are distinguished in two main ways: individualistic/collaborative orientations and conservationist/exploitative approaches to the local environment and resources. This is more of an organizing tool to consider different Antarctic futures as internally consistent states of affairs for decision testing, as opposed to predictions (Liggett et al. 2017; Avin and Goodspeed 2020). This research is also based on a “behavioral stress” approach, as proposed in the RAND tabletop exercise from “Antarctica at Risk” (BLACK et al. 2023), where different scenarios are distinguished in terms of “bend” scenarios, where behavior is expected to stay within certain boundaries, and “break” scenarios, where it might stretch beyond those boundaries and possibly even cross the “red lines” drawn by nations (BLACK et al. 2023; Sacks et al. 2022). This is very important for this research since the feasibility of the decisions to be made in the Antarctic region is not only dependent upon the environmental boundaries but also upon the sustainability of the consensus-based [POST] sovereign governance system (Evan T. Bloom 2025).
The second part of the methodology returns to the existing Antarctic governance framework and asks how well the current governance targets hold under different scenarios. Since it is revealed that the existing governance protocols do not provide any clear empirical thresholds for how the targets should perform, qualitative intensity scale is introduced and applied across all the four scenarios. This results in a stress test of governance outcomes, revealing where the current framework remains robust, and where it starts to thin out under pressure.
In order to explore the scenarios in a linear format, the first point marks the present, and the line ahead represents the intended future of the ATS and the Protocol: one that remains grounded in cooperation, science, and environmental protection within a conservation-oriented bubble. But that conservation path is not guaranteed. Growing tourism, resource interest, expanding logistics, geopolitical competition, and climate-driven access pressures can all push Antarctica away from protection and toward a more exploitative future. And once that shift begins, it can unfold in two very different ways: states may continue to work together while moving toward greater use and development, or they may act more independently, turning the same pressures into a more fragmented and competitive future.
First is the collaborative–conservationist scenario: a future where states continue to cooperate and environmental protection remains the dominant value. It is the outcome most aligned with the original intent of the Antarctic Treaty and the Madrid Protocol.
Then comes the individualistic–conservationist scenario: environmental protection still matters, but states begin acting more independently and coordination weakens. The Treaty can absorb some of this, but it starts to stretch, because conservation remains in place while shared governance becomes more uneven.
In the collaborative–exploitative scenario: states continue to collaborate, but that cooperation now supports greater development, access, and use. In that sense, the Treaty can still function here, but the Madrid Protocol is less prepared for a future where cooperation remains strong while environmental restraint weakens.
And finally, the worst-case individualistic–exploitative scenario: cooperation weakens, national interests harden, and development pressure rises at the same time. This is the scenario that places the greatest stress on Antarctic governance, AS IT OBLITERATES the Treaty’s cooperative spirit and the environmental logic of the Protocol.
To begin analyzing the current state, the site is translated into four [SPATIAL] indicators: building footprint, infrastructure organization, mobility and access networks, and environmental constraints. Together, they provide a way to read the current state of Fildes Peninsula not just as a collection of stations, but as a [SPATIAL] system.
What becomes clear is that the footprint is unevenly distributed, with Chile occupying almost half of the built area and carrying the highest level of activity. It also shows that labs do not exist on their own; they depend on a much larger support system of storage, logistics, recreation, and especially energy infrastructure, which today is highly duplicated across stations. Tourism is also beginning to emerge as its own land-use category.
The second major takeaway is that fragmentation has environmental consequences. Because the current footprint is dispersed, every separated building demands roads, utilities, and service access. When that is tested against wildlife and protected-area buffers, many roads and buildings fall within conflict zones, and power infrastructure appears most frequently inside those sensitive areas.
In the collaborative–conservationist scenario, the peninsula becomes more coordinated without becoming more aggressive. Footprints stay relatively compact, infrastructure is more likely to be shared, roads work as managed connectors rather than competitive extensions, and environmental protection remains strong.
In the collaborative–exploitative scenario, cooperation remains, but it now supports expansion rather than restraint. Footprints grow to accommodate exploitative uses like Tourism, infrastructure intensifies, and mobility networks become more active in service of access and development. Environmental controls are still there, but they can start to loosen under pressure.
In the individualistic–conservationist scenario, environmental protection still matters, but coordination between actors weakens. That means footprints remain somewhat controlled, yet infrastructure and access systems begin to fragment because each station acts more independently. peninsula starts to lose the spatial efficiency that collaboration would otherwise provide.
In the individualistic–exploitative scenario, the most stressed future by far, stations expand more competitively, infrastructure is duplicated, roads spread more aggressively, and environmental protection becomes weakest under pressure. This is the scenario where the limits of the current governance framework become most visible.
Building footprint is affected by both axes, but in different ways. Under more [COLLAB]orative conditions, footprint tends to remain more concentrated and [SPATIAL]ly legible, since shared planning reduces duplication and keeps growth tied to common systems. As governance becomes more individualistic, footprint begins to fragment, with separate actors extending their own built presence rather than consolidating around shared structures. Exploitative pressure adds another layer: it does not just fragment the footprint, but tends to increase its overall spread and intensity, pushing growth outward into areas that would otherwise remain less occupied.
Infrastructure organization is especially sensitive to governance style. In [COLLAB]orative futures, utility and service systems are more likely to remain shared, coordinated, or at least spatially rationalized, even if they are not fully merged. Once governance shifts toward individualism, infrastructure begins to duplicate, with separate energy systems, waste facilities, storage areas, and support zones emerging side by side. Exploitative pressure then intensifies the load on those systems, increasing the amount of service infrastructure needed to sustain expanded occupation.
Mobility and access networks behave in a similar way. Under [COLLAB]orative conditions, roads and movement corridors are more likely to function as shared connectors, linking stations and enabling common logistics, emergency response, and coordinated access. As governance becomes more individualistic, these networks begin to serve separate station logics, becoming less integrated and more vulnerable to uneven development. Exploitative pressure does not necessarily fragment the network by itself, but it increases the intensity of movement, encouraging road extension, heavier use, and greater encroachment into sensitive areas.
Environmental constraints remain present in all four scenarios, but their [SPATIAL] role changes significantly. In conservationist futures, they continue to function as active structuring limits, shaping where growth can occur and where restraint must be maintained. Under exploitative pressure, those same constraints begin to come under greater strain, as protected areas, ecological buffers, and sensitive zones are increasingly treated as [SPATIAL] obstacles rather than planning guides. Individualism adds a second problem: even when protection remains a stated value, enforcement and coordination become more uneven across actors. As a result, exploitative futures tend to increase pressure on environmental limits, while individualistic futures weaken the consistency with which those limits are observed.
So now the question becomes: what does one do with these narratives?
This is where scenario planning becomes useful as a testing tool. Instead of stopping at four future stories, they are used to test whether existing Antarctic governance targets like limiting cumulative footprint, protecting environmental value, and avoiding excessive concentration can actually hold under each future.
Governance targets are extrapolated for corresponding indicators from the ATS and madrid protocol below.
Existing Antarctic governance frameworks set out clear principles, but they do not provide empirical values or measurable thresholds for how those targets should be applied spatially. That is the gap. The low, medium, and high intensity system is proposed as a way of addressing it; it helps test how strongly each governance target is stressed under different scenarios, and where the current framework may need clearer planning guidance.
This table shows that the governance targets themselves do not change; the pressures around them do. As cooperation weakens, coordination-based targets such as shared infrastructure, emergency access, and protected-area management become harder to uphold. As exploitative pressure rises, footprint control, environmental protection, and infrastructure risk intensify.
That is exactly how this helps: it shows not just which future is more stressed, but why the existing governance framework begins to weaken, and where clearer spatial planning guidance is actually needed.
This is where scenario planning becomes especially useful. In a [POST]-sovereign condition, planning cannot rely on a single stable future, because the future of the territory depends on interacting drivers that exceed the control of any one actor. Geopolitical alignments may change; climate impacts may intensify; tourism may expand; scientific funding may shift; governance may remain [COLLAB]orative, or it may become more fragmented. Under such conditions, the value of scenario planning is not that it predicts what Antarctica will become, but it shall allow planners to test how [SPATIAL] systems and governance expectations perform across multiple plausible futures (Avin and Goodspeed 2020; Liggett et al. 2017).
That contribution is particularly important in Antarctica because the Treaty System is strongest as a normative framework and less developed as a [SPATIAL] planning regime. What it does not do, at least not in a planning sense, is specify how those values should be [SPATIAL]ly managed as conditions change. Scenario planning helps address that gap. It provides a way to ask whether the existing governance framework remains robust when cooperation weakens, when exploitative pressure rises, or when environmental stress intensifies. Put differently, scenario planning is useful here because it allows planning to operate without pretending that governance is settled. It accepts uncertainty as structural rather than exceptional. That makes it especially well-suited to a post-sovereign landscape such as Antarctica.